Abstract
This paper examines the triad nature-state-development within a Latin American context. The driving thread is Ecuador during the period when strong presence of the state in economic planning concurred with the dawn of the Ecuadorian oil era, emphasis is set on the years 1972-1976. When the developmentalist state managed to appropriate the largest portion of rents produced by its national subsoil, oil emerged as a main strategic resource to bankroll the national modernization project. A diachronic comparative approach to the domestic circumstances during last decade (2007-2017) suggests that despite of the emergence of buen vivir, an alternative-to-development discourse with a strong environmental component, the vision of modernization based on natural resources prevailed even after the still fresh end of the commodities’ boom of the 21st century.
Introduction
Latin American social thought has developed theoretical inputs powerful enough not only to dismantle pre-established notions about the nature-development relationship but also to reassess the concepts themselves. Key contributions of the Latin American schools of theories of (under)development have to do with the inclusion of the state as ubiquitous actor of the development process, and the role of natural resources within a generously gifted region. Hence, central debates have orbited around the role of the state in national modernization projects on the one hand, and, on the other, around states’ agency to face cycles within the capitalist world-economy. Most varied nuances of past century’s classic Latin American populism sheltered modernization projects alongside the region under the flag of developmentalism or desarrollismo, a political force that adhered most diverse society groupings and ideological trends. Extractivism, i.e. the “intensification of natural resources’ extraction for commodification in the global market” (Burchardt et al. 2016, 7), traditionally bankrolled desarrollismo, and its promise of rupture with nature dependence and rentism, whilst plentiful natural heritage historically molded region’s fate within the world-system. The 21st century commodities’ boom (2003-2014) provided further input to revisit the nature-development relationship. As a consequence of the environmental awareness which arose throughout the region during the last decades of the 20th century, socio-ecological impacts were involved when discussing on the (im)possibility of attaining development standards comparable to those of the Global North with a basis on natural resources. The still fresh end of the commodities’ boom, which in many ways recalls the dilemma of “internal decisions” versus “external constraints” (Amin 1990, 5), sparked further debates in Latin America on the prevalence of states’ agency within a new cycle of the world-economy.
Ecuador, traditionally a natural resources-dependent economy, and since 1972 an oil rent-dependent state, provides remarkable conditions to approach the triad nature-state-development, therefore, it is the driving thread of this paper. Contemporary development paradigms that predominated in the Latin American region mirrored in the country’s historical integration into the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy: 1) a period influenced by Latin American estructuralismo that encouraged import-substitution industrialization (ISI) attempts alongside the region, or ISI consensus, 2) a period shaped by neoliberalism, or Washington Consensus (WC), and 3) a period linked to the 21st century commodities’ boom, when neo-extractivism prevailed as a development strategy, or consenso de los commodities (Svampa 2013). Furthermore, during the last half-century, Ecuador underwent two oil booms. In periods shaped by high international oil prices, state’s agency was boosted domestically, and self-styled progresista governments declared the intention to prepare the leap to go beyond dependence on oil rent by promoting other economic sectors, as a key step within the national modernization project.
The paper begins with a rationalization of the triad nature-state-development within a Latin American context. Therefore, the metaphor of “sow the oil” (Uslar Pietri 1936) is utilized to refer to a planned transition to go beyond dependence on the primary sector of the economy. The expression was once enunciated to address the use of extractive rent in natural resources-dependent economies, and throughout eight decades it started to function as a discourse where “concepts, theories, and practices are systematically created” (Escobar 1995a, 39), hence, it fits well to highlight the relationships between nature, state and development. The paper argues that the developmentalist state is the subject who has been in charge of “sow the oil” in Latin America. The task implied departing from a previous outward-oriented development scheme based on exports of natural goods by pursuing the establishment of a more autonomous development project. Particular nuances of the way how the developmentalist state intended to sow the oil throughout time converged in the positivist idea of development, and the faith in planning as the means of homogenization with levels of consumption of industrialized economies. As environmental awareness increased alongside the region since the last decades of the 20th century, and nature was ultimately integrated to the debates on development, the sociopolitical field, where oil was to be sown, altered. Debates on development in the 21st century entail different meanings of nature held by dissimilar social actors which can antagonize the state’s vision.
After focusing on the region, the paper concentrates on Ecuador of the end of last century, with an emphasis on the years 1972-1976, a period when strong presence of the state concurred with the dawn of the Ecuadorian oil era. The classic developmentalist state model provides theoretical rationalization to approach the modernization attempt which coincided with the first Ecuadorian oil boom. Economic diversification was envisioned through the prism of industrialization, inspired by Latin American estructuralismo and its influence over development thought. Whilst, the sociopolitical field where oil was to be sown is best described by populism, not as a temporary phenomenon as modernization theory argued, but as the “norm rather than the exception” in Ecuadorian history (de la Torre 2000, 115). In other words, populism transfigured but was recognizable through its main characteristics: (1) its “Manichaean discourse” of people versus elites, (2) the building of coalitions of “emergent elites with the popular sectors”, (3) its “ambiguous relationship with democracy”, and (4) the social construction of a leader “as a symbol of redemption” (de la Torre 2000, 140). Regarding the latter, Cueva (2012, 229) argued that populism “materialized in caudillista movements”, instead of strong political parties. Hence, leaders (being presidents or dictators), appear in the forefront of the narrative. The dawn of the Ecuadorian oil era was coined by the struggle between the developmentalist state and multinational corporations for the appropriation of oil rent. Despite the original goal of nationalization was not achieved, the enforcement of nationalist policies by the self-styled revolutionary nationalist military dictatorship (1972-1976) assured state’s control of largest part of oil surplus. As a consequence, the state emerged as an “effective landlord” (Coronil 1997, 65), i.e. a state which is able to collect rents produced by its national subsoil. Hence, oil was regarded as a strategic resource, a natural resource appropriated by the state to serve the national modernization project.
The notion of strategic resources was central during the second Ecuadorian oil boom. A self-styled progresista government (2007-2017) vindicated state’s ownership of natural resources within a renewed nationalist trend triggered by the “left turn” of a significant portion of the Latin American region (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Beasley-Murray, Cameron and Hershberg 2010). The Ecuadorian self-styled progresista government reclaimed state’s key role in planning the economy as high international oil prices bankrolled developmentalist policies within the commodities’ boom of the 21st century. Though, different than the first oil boom was the presence of an environmental discourse during last decade. Discussions on the role of nature in the national development process reached a highpoint when buen vivir, an alternative-to-development discourse which promoted a harmonic relationship between nature and society, materialized in relevant articles of the 2008 Constitution as the nature or pachamama was granted rights. But concurring with its inclusion in official documents, the concept of buen vivir faded as it was despoiled of its “critic and transformer potential” (Peters 2014, 140) by suggesting rather development alternatives such as sustainable development (Alarcón and Mantilla 2017, 101) and human development (Cortez 2014, 338). Nonetheless, the ecological dimension of buen vivir, i.e. the prohibition to extract oil in bio-diverse and cultural-sensitive territories, was meant to materialize in the Yasuní-ITT initiative, a plan to save Yasuní National Park (YNP) in the Ecuadorian Amazonia from oil drilling. The government cancelled the initiative in 2013, and announced that oil rent of the YNP was to be used to fight poverty. Buen vivir turned into a “vague and polyphonic concept” (Alarcón and Mantilla 2017, 99), and evidenced its bareness as alternative to development. Its final blow brought back the vision of strategic resources in the center of the national modernization project: welcome back to the dawn of the oil era?
“Sow the oil”: Nature, the state, and development in Latin America
The rise of Latin American estructuralismo entailed elements of rejection to previous dominant theories of develop